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We developed a mathematical model to compare 2
indoor remediation strategies in the aftermath of an outdoor
release of 1.5 kg of anthrax spores in lower Manhattan. The
2 strategies are the fumigation approach used after the
2001 postal anthrax attack and a HEPA/vaccine plan,
which relies on HEPA vacuuming, HEPA air cleaners, and
vaccination of reoccupants. The HEPA/vaccine approach
leads to few anthrax cases among reoccupants if applied to
all but the most heavily contaminated buildings, and recov-
ery is much faster than under the decades-long fumigation
plan. Only modest environmental sampling is needed. A
surge capacity of 10,000 to 20,000 Hazmat workers is
required to perform remediation within 6 to 12 months and
to avoid permanent mass relocation. Because of the possi-
bility of a campaign of terrorist attacks, serious considera-
tion should be given to allowing or encouraging voluntary
self-service cleaning of lightly contaminated rooms by age-
appropriate, vaccinated, partially protected (through masks
or hoods) reoccupants or owners.
I
n addition to killing 5 of its 11 victims, the 2001 anthrax
attack on the U.S. Postal Service and federal facilities
also contaminated a number of buildings. The U.S. gov-
ernment spent several hundred million dollars recovering
buildings with large-area contamination by using chlorine
dioxide fumigation. The last of these federal facilities, the
Hamilton, New Jersey Mail Sorting Facility, is not expect-
ed to reopen until early 2005, >3 years after the attack (1).
A large-scale aerosol attack in a major metropolitan area
could deny access to a portion of a city for years, with sub-
stantial economic and social consequences. While outdoor
remediation would be challenging, the absence of sporici-
dal UV irradiation makes indoor remediation a particular-
ly daunting task. Nonetheless, no federal agency has taken
ownership of the wide-area remediation problem (2). A
proactive plan to recover affected buildings quickly, safe-
ly, inexpensively, credibly, and with minimal collateral
damage needs to be developed before such an event (2). To
advance the analysis of these recovery options, we propose
and evaluate a very simple HEPA/vaccine plan, where
HEPA air cleaners continuously clean the indoor air and
Hazmat workers use HEPA vacuums to clean the floors,
walls, ceilings, and room contents on a twice-a-day basis;
HEPAfilters are 99.97% effective for 0.3-µm particles (3),
which are 5–10 times smaller than a typical anthrax spore.
In addition, residents are vaccinated before reoccupying
the buildings. This strategy hypothesizes a nonzero stan-
dard for spore contamination and modest pre- and postre-
mediation environmental sampling (in contrast, >5,000
negative environmental samples were taken after the fumi-
gation of the Brentwood mail-processing facility [4]).The
plan employs no sporicides, such as sodium hypochlorite
(household bleach) or hydrogen peroxide, which can cause
collateral damage to many hard surfaces, and does not dis-
card carpets or furniture, which would generate profound
solid waste problems. Using a hypothetical release in
lower Manhattan, we compare the HEPA/vaccine and
chlorine dioxide fumigation remedial options, in terms of
anthrax cases among reoccupants, cost, and recovery time.
No attempt is made to estimate the number of cases of
cutaneous and gastrointestinal anthrax, which are less apt
to be fatal. Although we focus on anthrax remediation, our
framework may also be useful for indigenous agents of
public health concern (e.g., tuberculosis, Streptococcus).
Materials and Methods
A mathematical model (see online mathematical model
for details on model formulation and parameter estimation;
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol11no1/04-0635_mod.htm)
was used to evaluate the HEPA/vaccine (Figure 1) and
fumigation modalities. In the model, 1.5 kg of anthrax
spores is released outdoors in lower Manhattan from a
height of 2 m. We considered 92 different scenarios in
total, depending upon the release location and the wind
direction. Abuilding inventory of lower Manhattan (5) and
an atmospheric dispersion model (6) were used to calculate
the concentration of spores in each building in the exposed
region. We assumed that postattack environmental sam-
pling and plume analysis allow at least some of the
“exposed region” to be correctly diagnosed within 1 week
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assumed that by day 7, outdoor contamination would have
subsided to the point where it did not affect indoor spore
concentrations. 
Since chlorine dioxide fumigation eliminated all
detectable spores from the Hart Senate Office Building and
several mail-sorting facilities, we assumed that it success-
fully eliminates all spores in the buildings of our model. In
the 2001 attack, chlorine dioxide was used to decontami-
nate the 700-km2 Brentwood postal facility, which took 1
year at a cost of $130 million (4); further discussion of this
cost estimate appears in the online mathematical model.
Because the technology was new, we assumed that 50% of
the cost was a 1-time investment in technology develop-
ment. We further assumed a 90% learning curve in both
cost and time (at this time, only a small number of compa-
nies possess chlorine dioxide expertise); i.e., each time the
area of anthrax decontamination doubles, the marginal cost
and time are reduced by 10%. 
To assess the HEPA/vaccine plan, we developed a dif-
ferential equation model (Figure 2) of the spore dynamics
within a generic 12x12x8-ft room in a building in the
exposed region. The model measures the evolution of
spore concentration in the air, on the room surfaces, and in
the HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning) sys-
tem. A small fraction of spores adhere to the HVAC ducts
as they enter the building, and then become slowly disen-
gaged and enter the room. Rather than build multizone
models of each building (7), we assumed that each room
received air from a duct that is 50-m long, contains 360° of
curvature, and has an air velocity of 1,000 ft/min. We
implicitly assumed that all rooms within a building are
remediated simultaneously, so as to minimize the effect of
inter-room contamination within a building. Airborne
spores in the room deposit on the room surfaces at a cer-
tain rate, and spores on the room surfaces, particularly the
floor, reaerosolize at a rate that depends on the amount of
activity in the room; more reaerosolization occurs during
surface cleaning and reoccupation. The deposition rates
and reaerosolization rates were derived by using data from
the Hart Senate Office Building (8). HEPA air cleaners
(achieving 10 air changes per h, possibly with the aid of
dilution ventilation from the HVAC system) are used con-
tinually during the remedial period, which involves suc-
cessive rounds of testing and vacuuming until ns
postcleaning samples suggest that the floor spore concen-
tration in the room is below the target level  ; this
approach is reminiscent of that taken during the asbestos
remediation after the World Trade Center collapse (9).
Rather than use a spatial model to capture spatial hetero-
geneity of spores within a room, we simply assume that the
floor samples are log normally distributed, where 95% of
within-room samples at a fixed point in time are within 1
order-of-magnitude (i.e., within  and  of the
median), which is consistent with the sample variability in
the Hart Senate Office Building (8). That is, in the initial
testing of  samples, we estimate the number of 2-h vacu-
umings of the room’s surfaces and contents that are
required to achieve the target concentration   . After
these vacuumings, a new set of  ns samples are taken. If the
estimated concentration from these new samples is below
then remediation ceases; otherwise, another round of
vacuuming and testing is performed. Consecutive vacuum-
ings are 48 h apart, and testing (if needed) occurs midway
between these 2 vacuumings, both to allow reaerosolized
spores to resettle before testing and to permit the testing
results to be received before the next scheduled vacuum-
ing. We varied the 2 decision variables ns and to  explore
the tradeoffs among our performance measures. 
After the floor concentration is believed to have
dropped below  each generic room is reoccupied by 1
person for 12 h per day. After reoccupation, a portable
HEPA air cleaner (at 3 air exchanges per h [10]) is used
for 12 h every day, and 10 min of floor vacuuming occurs
weekly at half the estimated efficiency of the remedial
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Figure 1. Graphic overview of the mathematical model.
Mathematical submodels are in boxes. NYC, New York City. 
Figure 2. Graphic depiction of the compartments in the differential
equation model and the spore movement among compartments. vacuuming. We assumed that 85% of reoccupants are suc-
cessfully vaccinated and will not become infected, regard-
less of the spore concentration in the room. The remaining
15% represent infants, the elderly, the immunocompro-
mised, and persons for whom vaccination is contraindi-
cated, who are assumed to have a dose-response curve
that correspond to the lowest 30% of the probit dose-
response model (11) with a 50% infectious dose (ID50) of
8,000 spores (12) and a probit slope of 0.7 (13); e.g., the
ID15 from the probit model in (11) (i.e., 253 spores) would
infect half of the unvaccinated population. Here, ID50
denotes the dose that infects half of the population;
because inhalational anthrax is nearly always lethal (in the
absence of treatment), the ID50 coincides with the 50%
lethal dose (LD50). The differential equation model is used
to measure the cumulative number of spores inhaled by
each reoccupant in a 10-year period. Combining these
cumulative doses, the dose-response model, the atmos-
pheric dispersion model, and the population density of
reoccupants allows us to compute the total number of
inhalation anthrax cases.
The cost of the HEPA/vaccine plan includes $75/h for
each Hazmat worker, who spends 4 h per 10-h shift vacu-
uming and the remaining 6 h resting, rehydrating, and han-
dling protective gear; a $250 portable HEPAair cleaner for
each 12x12x8-ft room; $25 for each environmental sam-
ple, which includes the costs for sampling, shipping, and
laboratory testing; and $20 to vaccinate each person. If res-
idents are vaccinated regardless of the remediation/reoccu-
pation policy, the vaccination cost should be omitted from
the comparison. The remediation time for the HEPA/vac-
cine plan was computed by assuming that 1,000 Hazmat
workers (using level C protection) are available to perform
remediation 10 h per day, which is ≈3 times larger than the
labor force used at the Brentwood and Hart buildings, and
that 200 samplers can each perform 24 samples in 4 h plus
have 6 h for donning and removing protective gear, rest,
and rehydration. The bottleneck for the total remediation
time can be either sampling or vacuuming, depending
upon the values of the concentration threshold ( ) and the
number of samples per round (ns).
Results
We averaged the 92 scenarios to obtain a base case.
Figure 3Ashows the depositional distribution averaged for
the 92 scenarios, i.e., the number of square meters of
indoor floor area that are contaminated at various levels.
The particular forms of dips and peaks in Figures 3A and
3B are due to the irregular spatial distribution of tall build-
ings relative to the release location that caused the most
indoor contamination. The total contaminated area in this
average scenario is 5.73 x 107 m2, which is >4 million
12x12x8-ft rooms. For this base-case scenario, the fumiga-
tion plan costs $2.7 billion and takes 42 years. Figures
4A–C express the expected number of cases, cost, and time
of the HEPA/vaccine plan for the base-case scenario in
terms of the floor concentration threshold ( ) and the
number of floor samples per round (ns). Because of the
random sample measurements, 50 simulations were per-
formed to estimate each of the points in Figure 4, and the
95% half-confidence intervals are < 0.05 times the sample
mean in all cases. Figure 4A shows that the mean number
of anthrax cases is nearly independent of the number of
samples per round, and drops from ≈3,000 cases when the
floor concentration threshold is 100 spores/m2 to 28 cases
when the floor concentration threshold is 0.1 spores/m2. To
put these numbers in perspective, we also found that
15,760 cases would occur if no cleaning was performed
(i.e.,  ). The total cost in Figure 4B varies from $1.7
billion to $6 billion and depends more on the spore con-
centration threshold than the number of samples per round.
The mean remediation time ranges from 2.9 years to 39.3
years; since there are approximately 4 million rooms and
vacuuming can be done at the total rate of 2,000
rooms/day, it would take 5.5 years to clean each room
once. Vacuuming dictates the total remediation time in
Figure 4C when  ns= 1 and   = 0.1 or 1, and sampling is
the bottleneck for the other values of tested. Because using
ns > 1 increases the cost and time without decreasing
anthrax cases, we focus in Figure 4D on the cost versus
time tradeoff by fixing ns =1. 
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Figure 3. The amount of indoor floor area in lower Manhattan (ver-
tical axes) that is contaminated at various anthrax concentration
levels (horizontal axes) as a result of an outdoor release of 1.5 kg
of anthrax spores. Plot A, an average of 92 scenarios (9 release
locations in Manhattan times 8 wind directions, plus 20 release
locations on the outskirts of Manhattan). Plot B, provides similar
information for the scenario that generated the largest total area of
contamination. Figure 5 depicts the mean cases and mean remediation
time according to the amount of original spore deposition
in the rooms. Figure 5A suggests a hybrid strategy that
fumigates heavily contaminated rooms (>100 spores/m2)
and uses the HEPA/vaccine approach for lightly contami-
nated rooms (<100 spores/m2). This hybrid approach
results (on average) in only 2 anthrax cases, and the mean
remediation time for the lightly contaminated rooms is 5.9
years. It takes 8.4 years to fumigate the highly contaminat-
ed rooms. Hence, the total remediation time ranges from
8.4 to 14.3 years, depending upon whether different work-
ers are involved in the 2 decontamination modalities. For
the 3 other threshold levels pictured in Figures 5B–5D,
many of the anthrax cases occur right at the cutoff point,
which is due to the tail behavior of the spore depositional
distribution in Figure 3A. The hybrid strategy is not as
helpful with these higher threshold levels; e.g., using a
threshold of 1 spore/m2to decide between fumigation and
vacuuming in Figure 5A, the plan would vacuum for 2
years and fumigate for 28 years.
Sensitivity Analyses
A number of aspects of the model contain considerable
uncertainty: the cost and time of the fumigation plan, the
indoor spatial deposition after an attack, the reaerosoliza-
tion and deposition rates inside a room, spore dynamics in
a duct, air-cleaning efficacy, vacuum efficacy, Hazmat
logistics, the spatial heterogeneity in sampling, vaccine
coverage, and the low end of the dose-response curve.
Before discussing each of these 10 variables in turn, we
note that our general approach to these uncertainties is to be
conservative with respect to assessing the HEPA/vaccine
option; i.e., we err on the side of overstating the mean num-
ber of anthrax cases that would result under this approach
or understating the cost and time of the fumigation plan.
Although fumigation was successful during the cleanup
after the 2001 postal attack, the fumigation of a skyscraper
is a challenge that has yet to be tackled. Given the 42 years
it would take to fumigate the exposed area, an alternative
technology could be developed. 
The estimated indoor spatial deposition contains
orders-of-magnitude of uncertainty, depending upon the
size of the release, the spore characteristics (e.g., dry ver-
sus wet, size, purity, viability, surface electrostatic proper-
ties), the weather conditions, building and canopy terrain
in lower Manhattan, building HVAC infrastructure, and
whether or not windows and vents were open. The goal of
the atmospheric modeling is neither to accurately predict
the probability distribution of indoor spatial concentrations
for a possible future attack (such an attempt would be
greatly limited by the irreducible uncertainty in the release
size) nor to provide postattack situational awareness
(which would require a much more detailed spatial model),
but rather to generate a comparative set of plausible sce-
narios to evaluate remediation strategies before an attack.
Hence, we focused on the average of 92 plausible scenar-
ios. To give some sense of the upper range, we present
in Figure 4D the results from the most severe of the
92 scenarios; the deposition distribution from this scenario
appears in Figure 3B. This scenario contaminates
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Figure 4. Performance of the HEPA/vaccine
plan under the base-case scenario. The hori-
zontal axes in plots A-C are the number of floor
samples per round (ns). Each of plots A-C have
4 curves, 1 for each value of the floor concen-
tration threshold ( ). Cleaning stops after
the estimated floor concentration from ns sam-
ples per room is below the threshold   . The
vertical axes in plots A–C are A) the mean
number of inhalation anthrax cases, B) the
mean cost, and C) the mean recovery time. In
plots A-C, the concentration threshold ( )
has a much bigger impact than the number of
samples per room (ns) on these 3 performance
measures. Plot D shows the tradeoff of
anthrax cases versus recovery time in the
base case. The number of samples per room
is assumed to be ns= 1 in this plot, which is
derived from plots A–C. Plot D also contains
tradeoff curves for 3 sensitivity analyses: a
lower air-cleaning rate, increased sampling
variability of spore concentration, and the most
severe of the 92 cases depicted in Figure 3B.
This plot shows that the cases versus time
tradeoff curve is very insensitive to changes in
the air-cleaning rate and sampling variability.
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f c≈7 million rooms and requires 17.7 years to reduce the
number of cases to 98. 
Because air and surfaces are concomitantly remediated,
the number of anthrax cases is rather insensitive to the
reaerolization and deposition rates in the room. 
The large uncertainty with respect to duct modeling led
us to adopt a worst-case approach and use the spore disen-
gagement rate that maximizes the number of anthrax cases.
Many new buildings and some retrofitted older buildings
have HEPAfilters built into the HVAC system (14), which
would largely eliminate the risk for spore disengagement. 
We have focused on portable air cleaners, whereas dilu-
tion ventilation, in which 15%–25% of the total airflow
rate consists of outside airflow (15), may also play a key
role in remediation. Figure 4D also presents results when
we reduce the air-cleaning rate during remediation from
10/h to 3/h. The latter quantity, which can be achieved with
an off-the-shelf air cleaner and an open window (10), gen-
erates only a minor change in the cases versus time trade-
off curve. 
To the extent that reaerosolized spores resettled before
or during postvacuum testing in the referenced study (16),
we may have underestimated the vacuum efficacy. We
conservatively assumed that all floors are carpeted and that
sporicides such as sodium hypochlorite, hydrogen perox-
ide, or foams (17,18), which are much more effective than
vacuuming for hard surfaces, are not deployed. 
Our assumption that each Hazmat worker has 4 pro-
ductive hours of work per day underestimates the rate that
could be achieved over a several-week time frame but is
prudent over a longer period of time and would help avoid
worker fatigue and burnout. 
Because the amount of spatial heterogeneity of spores
in a room is difficult to assess, we considered the case
where 95% of samples within a room fall within 2 orders
of magnitude rather than 1. Figure 4D shows that the effect
of this increased sampling variability is negligible and that
the optimal amount of sampling did not change relative to
the base case. 
As noted in section 3.8 of the online mathematical
model, our 85% vaccine coverage of reoccupants may be a
considerable underestimate. No age groups are being left
behind in the plans for the next-generation anthrax vac-
cine, and persons with weak immune systems may achieve
partial protection. 
We considered a cumulative dose during a 10-year peri-
od, whereas infection may be a result of a challenge over a
shorter time horizon; our overestimate of cases is very
modest because of the exponential decreases in spore con-
centration during the reoccupation period, and changing
the horizon from 10 years to 6 months led to a negligible
(<1%) reduction in cases. Our dose-response model
assumed that the 15% unvaccinated population comes
from the most vulnerable 30% of a widely used probit
model, which itself has been criticized for greatly overes-
timating the number of cases at the lower end of the curve
(19). If we used 95% vaccine coverage with the remaining
5% sampled from the lower 50% of the probit model, then
the number of anthrax cases with   = 10 spores/m2 and
ns= 1 sample per round would be reduced from 341 to 72.
Even within the class of probit models, others have used a
probit slope twice as steep, which results in many fewer
cases (20). If we use a probit slope of 1.4 rather than 0.7,
then the mean number of cases with   = 10 spores/m2
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Figure 5. The horizontal axes in these 4
plots give the original room deposition
level before remediation begins. These
plots show how the total number of
anthrax cases (the stars and the left ver-
tical axes) are distributed across room
deposition levels, e.g., in plot A, most of
the anthrax cases occur in rooms with
original deposition levels >100 spores/m2.
Similarly, the 2 curves and the right verti-
cal axis of each plot show how much time
is spent cleaning and sampling in rooms
of various deposition levels. These 4 plots
are identical except that the spore con-
centration threshold in spores/m2 () ,
which dictates when remediation is
stopped, is A)  = 0.1; B)   = 1;
C)  = 10; D)  = 100. These plots
motivate the hybrid policy, which fumi-
gates heavily contaminated rooms and
uses the HEPA/vaccine approach in light-
ly contaminated rooms. 
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f cand  ns=1 sample per round decreases from 341 to
3 x 10-5, which highlights the value of further research into
the low end of the dose-response relationship. However, in
the online mathematical model we note that the slope of
0.7 is more consistent with data from the 2001 anthrax
attack. Dahlgren et al. (21) estimated that goat-hair mill
workers routinely inhaled about 500 (<5  µm) anthrax
spores per shift without accompanying illness or death,
raising the possibility (although no subsequent work on
this topic has been published) that chronic low-level expo-
sure might induce adaptive or innate immunity. In any
case, adaptive or innate immunity is unlikely to occur in
the 15% of people in our model who are not successfully
vaccinated. One assumption that is not conservative is that
people reoccupy these rooms for 12 h per day. A small
fraction of people may work at home, stay at home most of
the day, or work and live in different buildings within the
exposed region. We are underestimating the inhaled doses
for these people by a factor of 2. Nonetheless, taken
together, the numerical results reported here may overstate
the actual number of anthrax cases by at least 1 order of
magnitude, and perhaps many.
Discussion
The base-case release, which is an average of 92 differ-
ent scenarios under various weather conditions and loca-
tions in lower Manhattan, contaminates the equivalent of 4
million 12x12x8-ft rooms. Our analysis suggests that an
outdoor release would generate a more diffuse depositional
distribution of spores than an indoor attack: we estimate that
≈10,000 spores/m2 were deposited in parts of the Hart
Senate Office Building (section 3.2 of the online mathemat-
ical model), which is considerably higher than the concen-
trations in Figure 3. As an alternative to a multidecade
fumigation effort, the HEPA/vaccine plan appears capable
of substantially reducing the number of anthrax cases but
would require ≈8 years with the current estimated Hazmat
labor pool. Both plans would require several billion dollars
in direct costs. The HEPA/vaccine plan eventually experi-
ences diminishing returns: from a base of 341 expected
cases after 3.6 years of remediation, another year is required
to reduce the mean number of cases to 67, but then an addi-
tional 3.6 years and $1 billion are needed to reduce the
mean number of cases to 28. A hybrid HEPA/vaccine/
fumigation plan, in which lightly contaminated buildings
receive the HEPA/vaccine approach and heavily contami-
nated buildings are fumigated, could eliminate almost all of
the anthrax cases. The required remediation time would be
8.4–14.3 years, depending upon whether the same Hazmat
personnel carried out both operations.
A key finding of our study is that only a moderate
amount of sampling appears to be required. In theory, addi-
tional sampling reduces type I and type II errors, thereby
avoiding anthrax cases in rooms that were inadvertently
thought to be sufficiently safe, and reducing unnecessary
remediation of rooms that were mistakenly perceived as
overly contaminated. However, the number of anthrax
cases was essentially independent of the number of room
samples per round, as long as at least 1 sample was taken.
Indeed, with current vacuuming and sampling capacity, the
only impact from taking >1 sample per 12x12x8-ft room is
prolonged remediation and increased cost. However, in the
absence of exhaustive environmental testing, on-site coor-
dinators need to validate that work is performed according
to the required standards (i.e., vacuuming is actually being
done for the specified number of minutes/m2).
Our results have several implications. First and fore-
most, field tests with simulants are required to accurately
assess the real-world spore reduction that can be
achieved—and the number of vacuumings required—by
this HEPA/vaccine approach. If field tests confirm the
model predictions, then the concentration threshold  , the
number of samples per round ns, and the level of concen-
tration that requires fumigation versus vacuuming should
be determined with greater precision. These threshold val-
ues should be chosen so that the reoccupant risk level (in
terms of quality-adjusted life years) is consistent with
those for other hazards (e.g., asbestos, radiation).
Large-area urban remediation strategies must confront
a number of difficult issues, the most important of which
is surge Hazmat capacity. We have assumed that remedia-
tion and vaccination are initiated simultaneously 1 week
after the attack. The initial vaccination of reoccupants
would require ≈1 week; protective immunity is believed to
develop at 35 days after initial vaccination (22). Hence,
residents will be able to reoccupy buildings by 42 days
after remediation is initiated. Presumably, most reoccu-
pants would receive prophylactic antimicrobial agents
because they would have been in these building during or
soon after their exposure. Consequently, some of these res-
idents may be interested in moving back in even earlier.
Considering that 8.2 years is required to carry out the
HEPA/vaccine plan in the base-case scenario, this reoccu-
pancy delay may be viewed by the major stakeholders as
unacceptable. Our analysis assumes the availability of
1,000 Hazmat personnel, compared to the 300 Hazmat
workers (after attrition) used to perform the Brentwood
cleanup and the roughly 3,000 licensed asbestos workers
in New York State. To reduce the recovery delay from 8.2
years to 5 months requires a 20-fold increase in Hazmat
labor, i.e., 20,000 personnel. To reduce the delay another
4-fold so as to allow reoccupation within 42 days is prob-
ably not realistic for this large-area scenario. Nonetheless,
U.S. government coordination with the Hazmat, fumiga-
tion, and building protection industries—not just locally,
but nationwide and perhaps including the U.S. military and
f c
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capacity and resources. In addition, scheduling theory (23)
implies that aggregate waiting time for reoccupants can be
minimized by remediating the least-contaminated build-
ings first (i.e., use the shortest expected processing time
priority rule).
There are other aspects to optimizing surge remediation
and recovery capacity. Just as the worried well caused a
surge in ciproflaxin sales in 2001, many people outside of
the exposed region will attempt to buy HEPA air cleaners
and vacuums. Hence, demand will come not only from the
exposed area but also from surrounding regions. In the
same way that the U.S. government is working with phar-
maceutical companies to provide surge capacity of medical
countermeasures (including anthrax vaccine) in the event
of a biologic attack, it needs to develop cooperative agree-
ments with building protection service companies so that
equipment shortages do not block the critical path to
recovering the exposed area. 
Another key aspect of a detailed plan is exception man-
agement: the HEPA/vaccine plan will not work for 100%
of the buildings in the exposed area. More aggressive
remediation of critical assets (hospitals; nursing homes;
daycare centers; emergency response facilities; electrical,
water and sanitation facilities; transportation facilities)
will be desirable. Some nonresidential buildings (such as
the buildings contaminated in the 2001 attack) have
extremely high ceilings, and achieving a high air-exchange
rate in these spaces may be not be feasible with portable air
cleaners. Another confounding issue is visitors to the
impacted region. In the aftermath of a catastrophic anthrax
attack, the public would expect nationwide voluntary mass
vaccination. Visitors to the exposed areas should be
offered an anthrax vaccine, and guidelines for unvaccinat-
ed visitors should be developed. Also, because the spore
concentration continues to decrease exponentially during
reoccupation (but not during semiquiescent periods), more
vulnerable residents might delay their reoccupation until
several months after the other residents. A significant
logistical issue is the disposal of contaminated carpets, fur-
niture, and other household goods. Some reoccupants will
insist on discarding these items, even after they have been
heavily cleaned. Reoccupant education and outreach meas-
ures, including perhaps temporal or financial disincentives
for disposal, need to be taken to avoid overwhelming solid
waste disposal capacity. Emergency plans (e.g., medical
incinerator capacity) should be developed for the HEPA
vacuum bags and other items that need to be discarded dur-
ing remediation. Another difficult issue is postevent build-
ing maintenance, particularly of HVAC systems, which
must minimize spore reaerosolization during maintenance
and disposal of old ducts. Safe procedures to rid ducts of
asbestos (asbestos fibers are roughly the same size as
anthrax spores, but the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency limit for asbestos is 900 fibers/m3 [9], which is
larger than the postremediation spore concentrations con-
sidered here) and other materials have been developed
(24); the important point is that HVAC cleaning should not
block the critical path to reoccupation but rather should be
performed asynchronously in a low-intensity manner over
many years. 
In summary, this study suggests that a HEPA/vaccine
approach is viable for most buildings after a large-scale
anthrax attack. This outcome is dependent on a qualitative
increase in surge Hazmat remediation capacity to reduce
the recovery delay to a level that would not invite perma-
nent mass relocation. Detailed mass remediation plans
need to be developed now; as noted by Danzig (2), without
such a plan we are inviting economic and social disruption.
Ultimately, the extent of restoration and sampling will be
dictated by the reoccupants and building owners, and
hence risk communication will be of the utmost impor-
tance. Inconvenience and cost may force relaxation of
standards, and some thought should be given to whether
voluntary “self-service” cleaning of minimally contami-
nated rooms by age-appropriate, vaccinated, partially pro-
tected (e.g., with N95 masks) reoccupants or owners
would be allowed or encouraged. Indeed, in the face of a
campaign of terrorist attacks (2), this self-service
approach, with more effective masks or hoods, may be the
only feasible response. Finally, a safe, effective, single-
dose vaccine would have a profound impact on mitigating
the undesirable consequences of this scenario.
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